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Abstract This paper synthesizes important elements from case studies pre-
sented in its companion paper (Quigley et al., 2019) to define mutual and
distinct characteristics and to develop a more holistic understanding of how
earth science was used to support diverse examples of decision-making. We
identify a suite of 28 di↵erent science actions used within the case studies that
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are classified as pertaining to: (i) evidence acquisition and analysis, (ii) pro-
vision of science to target audience, or (iii) enhancing future science provision
and utility. Sample action pathways provide empirically-evidenced, albeit sim-
plified, examples of how scientists may contribute to the progression of science
through complex decision-making frameworks. Decision trees with multiple
scientific and non-scientific inputs are presented based on empirical evidence
and theory to provide scientists and decision-makers with simplified examples
of complex multi-stepped decision-making processes under conditions of risk
and uncertainty. Evidence for nonlinear engagement between decision-makers
and science providers is presented, including non-traditional approaches such
as provision of unsolicited science through the media and stake-holders. Ex-
amples of scientically-informed, precautionary decision-making with adaptive
capacity, even where more economically-favourable decision alternatives ex-
ist, are provided. We undertake a self-elicitation exercise of case studies to
derive values and uncertainties for % scientific agreement amongst utilized in-
puts and % uptake of potentially-relevant and available science. We observe a
tendency towards increased scientific uptake with increasing scientific agree-
ment, but this is not ubiquitous; politically-a↵ected decisions and/or complex
multi-decision scenarios under time pressure complicate this relationship. An
increasing need for decision-making expediency that is not met by increased
availability of relevant science evidence may rely on expert-judgement based
on incomplete knowledge that is manifested as large uncertainties in defining
a singular value for scientific agreement and uptake. We encourage scientists
to further document their experiences using the science action classification
scheme provided herein to stimulate further comparative analyses of this na-
ture.
Keywords Earth science · policy · decision-making · natural disasters
1 Introduction
Scientists are increasingly motivated to provide scientific evidence to decision-
makers. This is clear from calls to appoint and increase the involvement
of science advisors in decision-making processes (Doubleday and Wilsdon,
2012; Gluckman, 2014; Schaal, 2017), contemporary research aimed at improv-
ing communications of science and scientific uncertainty to decision-makers
(Fischo↵ and Davis, 2014; Aspinall, 2010), improving elicitations of expert
science advice (Aspinall, 2010), and understanding science communicator pri-
ority objectives and behaviors (Dudo and Besley, 2016; Nisbet and Markowitz,
2015). Academic institutions are being encouraged to facilitate better dialogue
amongst scientists and decision-makers (Whitmer et al., 2010), and some are
responding by establishing specific programs with this purpose1. Moreover,
there is a growing corpus of peer-reviewed literature describing how scientific
1 Notably, Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, Cambridge
University, UK, https://medium.com/wintoncentre; Institute for Risk and Un-
certainty, University of Liverpool, UK, https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/risk-and-
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evidence can contribute to policy, emergency, and other types of decision-
making (Gluckman, 2014; Brownson et al., 2009; Foster et al., 2000; Seeger,
2006; Gluckman, 2016; Langer et al., 2016), and provide data and knowledge
to facilitate “Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways” for decision-making in cases
of high uncertainty (Haasnoot et al., 2013).
The above actions do not guarantee a more prominent role for science in
decision-making. Nor does the provision of science to decision-makers ensure
decisions will align with prevailing scientific evidence. Decision-making often
requires consideration of fiscal, cultural, and political inputs and personal val-
ues and beliefs (Krupnick et al., 2006; Nutbeam and Boxall, 2008), some of
which may not be amendable to objective analysis (Gillieson, 2004; Karr,
2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Non-scientific inputs may be prioritized even if
decision-makers understand the nature and value of the contributing science
(Sutherland et al., 2013). Initial proposals to reduce science funding (Reardon
et al., 2017) and attempts to devalue the role of science (Mervis, 2017) suggest
that not all leaders seek an increasing role for science in decision-making. Base
knowledge, experience, context and potential bias of the decision-makers may
influence how science is interpreted (Frodeman, 1995). A need for expediency
or imposed fiscal constraints may require decisions to be made without con-
sideration of potentially relevant inputs, including scientific information. Un-
certainties inherent in decision-making can include scenarios that pose signif-
icant risks to human life, infrastructure, and environment. Further, perceived
immediate risks may need to be addressed without considering all potentially-
relevant scientific evidence. The temporal context of decision-making may ne-
cessitate use of pre-existing protocols and science advisors, or provide time to
develop existing or new relationships, Scientists with knowledge and/or exper-
tise relevant to decision-making may not know who to contact, how to contact
them, or what to say.
Here we present evidence from seven case studies (described in detail in a
companion paper; Quigley et al., 2019), in which the authors have been par-
ticipants in and/or possess knowledge of the processes by which science was
provided to and utilized by decision-makers. These case studies are drawn from
the experiences of the authors. To facilitate a broad range of perspectives and
to prevent bias in the selection of case studies from limiting the conclusions in
this study, we established no a priori criteria for including or excluding case
studies. The insights elicited from these case studies are drawn from the expe-
riences of scientists working across a range of disciplines who came together as
part of the 2016 Theo Murphy High Flyers Think Tank: An interdisciplinary
approach to living in a risky world (refer to Colyvan et al. (2017) for further
details). These case studies, written from the perspective of scientists engaged
in the communication of science to decision makers, illustrates both common
elements to communication as well as highlighting the diversity in science
communications and decisions outcomes required for di↵erent scenarios. We
uncertainty; Mitchell Centre for Sustainability Solutions, University of Maine, USA,
https://umaine.edu/mitchellcenter/; Program on Science in the Public Interest, George-
town University, USA, https://spi.georgetown.edu
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acknowledge that the inclusion of additional or alternative case studies may
elicit additional (or di↵erent) conclusions.
We (i) define the science providers, decision-makers, and science provision
actions involved in the case studies, (ii) identify and classify diverse scien-
tific actions contributing to the decision-making, and (iii) develop empirically-
evidenced and theoretical decision trees, and use them to illustrate how earth
science inputs inform decision-making. The extent to which decisions aligned
with prevailing science evidence is compared with qualitative estimates of the
volume and scientific consensus of the contributed science. Our work builds
upon lessons learned from prior analyses of case studies (e.g. Gluckman, 2014;
Pielke Jr and Conant, 2003): (1) science provides only one of many relevant
components in the process of decision-making; (2) predictions drawn from
scientific inputs should not be conflated with policy; and (3) many scientific
products are di cult to evaluate and easy to misuse. Further, scientific inputs
may have varying levels of accuracy, sophistication, and experience that are
not always well described and considered in decision-making (Pielke Jr, 2003).
Our work o↵ers empirical examples to supplement a rich volume of litera-
ture on how science may contribute to decision-making in conditions involving
risk and uncertainty. Relevant literature includes treatises on decision the-
ory (North, 1968; Varis, 1997; White, 2018), risk governance and management
(Aven and Renn, 2010; Van Asselt and Renn, 2011), and science-policy models
informed by analyses of boundary organizations, knowledge systems and inte-
grated scientific assessments (Kirchho↵ et al., 2013; Cash et al., 2006; Feldman,
2009). Prior research has described how earth science may best contribute to
decision-making in the fields of climate science (see Dilling and Lemos, 2011,
and references therein) and emergency and disaster management (Kapucu and
Garayev, 2011; Zhou et al., 2018). Central conclusions drawn from many stud-
ies are that (1) the loading-dock model for science provision is unlikely to be
successful (i.e., scientists prepare models, products, forecasts or other informa-
tion for general use, without consulting with, or understanding the needs of,
potential end users, and with the expectation that the information provided
will still be useful; see, e.g., Cash et al., 2006); (2) the establishment of multi-
disciplinary and collaborative knowledge networks of policy makers, scientists,
government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations may broaden and
diversify communication pathways and decision spaces, and increase reliabil-
ity, credibility, and trust, to the collective benefit of decision-making (Feldman,
2009); and (3) boundary organizations may stabilize and increase the e ciency
of science knowledge and product delivery to stakeholders and decision-makers
(e.g. Kirchho↵ et al., 2013).
1.1 Definitions
Before we begin our analysis of the case studies described in Quigley et al.
(2019), we shall clarify our identities and perspectives. Collectively, we are
“science providers”, herein identified as university, government or industry sci-
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entists, who are the creators and/or possessors of a specifically-defined quanta
of data, knowledge, and/or expertise (herein referred to as science, scientific
information, science provisions, data, models, or expertise), which we have di-
rectly or indirectly (via another science provider) communicated to “decision
makers” (see Table 1 in §3.1). The scope of this paper is limited to the physical
earth and agricultural sciences; other fields of science (e.g. social, political and
economic sciences) are relevant to many of the case studies examined but not
evaluated in this paper. The identities of decision-makers in this study are lim-
ited to individuals or collectives of individuals within governmental agencies,
emergency response agencies, committees, infrastructure providers, industries
and businesses (Table 1) who are specifically tasked with making strategic
and/or operational decisions using a↵ective and analytical processes (Doyle
and Paton (2018)). A “stakeholder” is used to describe any actor (institution,
group or individual) with an interest or a role to play in a decision-making
process. In a broad sense, we recognize that many individuals may have shared
identities as science-providers, decision-makers, and stakeholders in a variety
of contexts (e.g., a scientist may have a vested interest or role in a decision-
making outcome, a scientist may make decisions as to whether to research
a given theme and how to conduct this research) however the level of speci-
ficity applied to these definitions of these groups herein attempts to limit this
overlap.
The processes by which science is acquired and communicated to decision-
makers are described using a series of science actions that we classify as per-
taining to (i) the acquisition and analysis of scientific information, (ii) the
provision of science, and (iii) the support of science utility (see Figure 1 in
§3.2). We o↵er sample “science provision pathways” (Figure 1) that are drawn
from our collective experiences, although these are not intended to represent
the science provision and utility process as a linear or deficit model, but rather
to provide a sample pathway whose “viability” is evidenced by our experiences.
We acknowledge that science providers needn’t necessarily be scientists
(e.g., political advocates, media, or policy makers), but in this study we delib-
erately limit our scope to our own experiences. Because all science provisions
are accompanied by uncertainties (Table 1), and the diverse range of decision-
makers investigated herein have all, by definition, been responsible for selecting
a decision from at least two distinct alternatives, then each decision-making
process is accompanied by risks. The “risks considered” in Table 1 refer only to
those that include risks of fatality, injury, or other undesired personal health
e↵ects to a specified member or members of the general public, risks to per-
sonal wealth or business, risks to infrastructure, and/or risks to environment,
including flora and fauna. They do not include such ubiquitous features of de-
cision making as economic risks, political risks and public perception. Many of
these latter risks are relevant to some of the case studies investigated herein,
however we do not focus on their roles in this study. The consideration of
science throughout the decision-making process is herein also referred to as
the science uptake or utility by decision-makers. As a collective of earth scien-
tists with expertise in scientific data acquisition, analysis, and communication,
6 Quigley et al.
but with limited expertise in aspects of decision theory, science policy, and
decision-making analysis, the primary motive of our study presented herein
is to communicate our experiences in specific case studies. Formal training in
decision theory is limited amongst scientists, which can limit their capacity
to apply decision theory approaches to their communications with decision
makers. By presenting communication approaches from the perspective of sci-
entists, we expect our approach to resonate with other scientists, and provide
an accessible framework from which to review and evaluate their own scien-
tific communications to decision makers. The results presented herein may be
further analysed by those with more expertise in decision theory and analysis.
2 Case studies
Case study S1 examines land-use zoning decisions in response to natural haz-
ard impacts during the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence in New
Zealand and assessments of future risk. In response to calculated life safety
risks from future rockfall and cli↵ collapse (case study S1a; Massey et al.,
2014), the NZ central government-appointed Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority (CERA) made “red zone” purchase o↵ers in June 2012 to owners of
properties where the annual individual fatality risk estimated from modelling
of future rockfall and cli↵-collapse hazards and associated exposure and vul-
nerabilities was greater than or equal to “acceptable” thresholds of 1 in 10,000
years. Zoning decisions were independently reviewed and expanded upon from
October to December 2011. Following review, a final total of 714 Port Hills
properties were zoned red and Crown o↵ers were made to their owners if
they were insured2. Further opportunities were created for a↵ected residents
to challenge land-zone decisions. In response to liquefaction-induced land and
property damage, CERA also purchased 7,346 red-zoned residential proper-
ties in greater Christchurch (case study S1b). The justification for liquefaction
red zone decisions as stated by CERA was (i) significant and extensive area
wide land damage had occurred, (ii) design, success and possible commence-
ment of engineering solutions given ongoing seismic activity were uncertain,
and (iii) repair would be disruptive and protracted for landowners. In reality,
as disclosed in the “Brownlee paper” presented in confidence by the Minis-
ter for Earthquake Recovery to the New Zealand Cabinet3, the equation used
to undertake red-zone decision-making drew fundamentally on economic in-
puts, although science and engineering experts were consulted in this process.
Land use planning changes required development of a new Christchurch City
Replacement District Plan prepared by the Christchurch City Council in col-
laboration with government, university and industry scientists. Some a↵ected
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Case study S2 examines decisions made by land holders around crop inputs
and management in a developing agricultural region in Northern Queensland,
Australia. It examines a particular case where a land holder posed a ques-
tion regarding planting dates and irrigation management of a chickpea (Cicer
arietinum L.) crop. As there were no experimental data for this region to
base advice on, biophysical modelling was used to examine a range of crop-
ping scenarios. The case study examines how the results of such analysis can
be e↵ectively communicated (along with the modelling uncertainty) beyond
individual farm businesses to whole sectors of the agricultural industry.
Case study S3 examines the provision and receipt of flood forecasts during
operational response, and challenges identified by both providers of scientific
advice, and decision-makers reliant on the advice. Challenging aspects in the
communication of flood forecasting include the absence of a standardised ap-
proach to communicating uncertainty (e.g., via error bounds) within flood
forecasts.
Case study S4 details a scientist-led process undertaken for the 2016 Tas-
manian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment, which provided the emer-
gency management sector and key Government decision-makers with risk-
based information to help prepare for and reduce the impact of natural disas-
ters, including bushfires, floods, severe storms, earthquakes, landslides, coastal
inundations, heatwaves and influenza pandemics. The process relied on inter-
disciplinary cooperation and collaboration, as opposed to science communica-
tion only. The use of “confidence” ratings allowed for uncertainty in data or
disagreement between experts to be taken into account during the analysis.
However, the lack of provision to be able to combine expertise with confidence
into a single communicable and reportable value was found to be a limiting
factor.
Case study S5 examines the use of scientific evidence in an application made
by a NZ-based company in 2014 for consent to mine phosphorite nodules in
NZ’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The application was unsuccessful, with the
decision-making committee appointed by an Environmental Protection Au-
thority citing concerns related to the impact of the drag-head on the seabed
and the benthic fauna in and on the seabed. The committee concluded that
there was likely to be significant and permanent damage to the benthic en-
vironment, modest economic benefits compared to environmental e↵ects, and
significant e↵ect on the Benthic Protection Area, which overlapped with part
of the permitted area.
Case study S6 examines the use of geological modelling in making informed
decisions regarding exploration and extraction of resources. The use of models
is widespread in minerals and petroleum industries, as they provide a repre-
sentation of the subsurface, and indicate the location and volume of a resource.
An example from the Gippsland Basin — a mature oil and gas producing re-
gion in southeastern Australia, and under study as a potential site location for
CO2 sequestration — is presented, focussing on how model uncertainties are
located and measured. A second example, describing the resource evaluation
of a Canadian gold deposit, shows how scientific evidence (modelling) was
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used to downgrade the resources, rendering the deposit sub-economic, with
economic impacts on the holding company.
Case study S7 investigates the challenges around pollutant load estima-
tion and reporting for the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), noting that scientific
uncertainty has recently been identified as an important component to GBR
reporting in two external reviews, and discussions are underway to determine
how best to quantify, interpret and communicate uncertainty for decision-
making activities. It is noted that despite significant methodological advances
in the quantification of pollutant loads and their uncertainties for the GBR to
date, these approaches to uncertainty quantification have not made it into the
GBR report card, nor have they been used in the prioritisation of catchments.
3 Results
3.1 Science providers, decision-makers and risks
Table 1 identifies the science providers, decision-makers and risks considered
in each of the seven case studies, S1–S7. Science providers include government
scientists (S1, S3–S7), university researchers (S1, S2, S4–S7), and industry
scientists (S1, S2, S4–S7). Decision-makers include governmental agencies (S1,
S3, S4), emergency response agencies (S3, S4), appointed committees (S1,
S5, S7), infrastructure providers (S1, S3, S4), and industries/businesses (S2,
S4, S6). Some cases have multiple decision-makers because decision-making
required iterative steps (S1) or a single decision-making process involved mul-
tiple working parties and decision-makers (S4). Enacted decisions relate to
policy development with or without implementation (S1, S4, S5, S7), emer-
gency management (S3, S4), natural economic resource management (S4, S5,
S6), and environmental protection (S2, S4, S5, S7). Considered risks include
immediate endangerment of human life and safety (S1, S3, S4), infrastructure
(S1, S4), environment (S1, S2, S4, S5, S7), food and biosecurity (S2, S4, S5,
S7), and economy (S2, S4–S7).
Scientific information was solicited and considered by decision-makers in
all cases. In some cases, science providers with relevant specific expertise and
unique data were not initially solicited by decision-makers and/or acting sci-
ence providers to participate in science provision actions (S1, S3, S4, S6).
Reasons for this include decision-makers’ unawareness that additional relevant
science expertise and data existed (S1, S4), a lack of time, financial resources,
and/or perceived need to seek the involvement of additional science providers
during decision-making (S4), infeasibility of seeking additional science sup-
port due to the time-sensitive need to follow emergency protocols (S3), or
confidential requirements of the decision-maker (S6). In five cases (S1, S2, S4–
S6), decision-makers ultimately considered relevant science that they did not
initially solicit. Some of this was sourced through existing scientific literature
by initially solicited science providers (S1,S2, S4–S6) and some entered into
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Table 1 Case study science provider and decision-maker identities, risks considered, and
inclusion of initially solicited vs. unsolicited science provisions in decision-making.
decision-making through inclusion of information from new science providers
in response to stakeholder requests (S1, S5).
Table 2 summarizes the stimulating e↵ects, consequences and decision-
making needs for each case study. In S1, earthquake-triggered phenomena
(stimulating e↵ects) including rockfalls, cli↵ collapse, and liquefaction caused
fatalities, injuries, and damage to land and infrastructure (consequences). The
decision-making needs related to the responsibility of government agencies to
address life safety, socioeconomic and infrastructure risks associated with these
and future possible e↵ects. When considering risk mitigation and avoidance
strategies, prohibitive land re-zoning emerged as a justifiable decision pathway.
In S2, agricultural development (stimulating e↵ect), driven by maximising fi-
nancial returns (consequences), led to decision-making needs for farmers in
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Table 2 Stimulating e↵ects, consequences and decision-making needs for each case study.
choosing crops and inputs. In S3, flooding events in urban areas (stimulating
e↵ects) were studied using forecast models to examine the potential for iso-
lation or inundation of properties (consequences). The potential occurrence
of fatalities, injuries and loss of services defines a need for emergency man-
agers to understand and respond to these risks. In S4, the combined threat
of bushfires, tsunamis, influenza pandemics and other natural disasters (stim-
ulating e↵ects) on the population and environment (consequences), resulted
in decision-making needs for the Tasmanian emergency management sector
regarding prioritization of risk-reduction actions. In S5, prospective deep-sea
mining in New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (stimulating e↵ect) and
its impact on the benthic environment (consequences), required the decision-
making authority to balance the financial incentives versus the potential envi-
ronmental damage. In S6, oil and gas exploration (stimulating e↵ect) is a costly
and hazardous undertaking with lucrative financial rewards (consequences),
resulting in decision-makers needing reliable predictions of the location and
value of the natural resources to maximize productivity and profits. In S7,
declining water quality due to land based pollutant discharge (stimulating ef-
fects) has adversely impacted coral and seagrass communities, reducing the
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Fig. 1 Science provider actions and provision pathways.
habitat for marine life (consequences), and decision-maker needs are driven by
reducing these impacts.
Not all decision-making needs are explicitly motivated by reducing adverse
risks, but all are a↵ected by adverse risks. For example, decision-maker needs
in S2 and S6 are motivated by increasing agricultural and geological resource
productivity, respectively, but both contain adverse risks such as environmen-
tal damage and increased fiscal expenditure without su cient productivity
that results in net economic loss.
3.2 Science actions and provision pathways
Figure 1 shows how scientists may meet the needs of decision-makers by ac-
quiring, analysing and communicating scientific information using a variety
of science actions. It presents one possible schema to classify and order sci-
ence actions. This schema was developed based on the common experiences
and insights of the authors. The categorization and organization of actions
12 Quigley et al.
is consistent with prior work. While not exhaustive, the schema provides an
organisation of steps for consideration by scientists when communicating un-
certainty to decision-makers. Not all steps are warranted, or practicable, in all
situations. However, consideration of all steps is warranted as it may prompt
identification of actions that would improve communication under uncertainty.
In Figure 1, science actions are Class 1 - acquisition and analysis of scientific
information; Class 2 - provision of science to target audience; Class 3 - enhanc-
ing future provision and utility of science to decision-makers. Inherent in these
actions is adherence to ethical scientific conduct (Science Council of Japan,
2013; Doyle et al., 2019).
The scientific actions described in Figure 1 may be concurrently or sequen-
tially undertaken by multiple science providers comprising multiple individuals
and/or collectives. Box 1 of Figure 1 lists the scientific actions undertaken in
the seven case studies by at least one science provider (and known to the
authors of this paper).
Box 2 of Figure 1 provides viable science provision pathways that reveal the
order in which a suite of actions undertaken by a specific individual or group
led to ultimate acquisition and utility of scientific information by decision-
makers. By “viable”, we simply mean that the actions are listed in a gen-
eralized chronologic order, although many actions may have been undertaken
concurrently with others. This model framework significantly simplifies the full
complexity and populous of possible science actions and provision pathways.
Its purpose, however, is to o↵er examples of some of the diverse actions and
pathways by which science providers have communicated to decision-makers
throughout the decision-making process, as discussed below.
In S1a, scientists used almost all listed actions and science provision path-
ways. In response to fatalities and land and property damage caused by rockfall
in the Christchurch earthquakes, the Christchurch City Council (CCC), with
additional funding from the NZ Natural Hazard Research Platform (NZHRP),
commissioned investigations by the government research institute GNS Science
and university and industry partners to quantify and construct maps of the an-
nual individual fatality risk (AIFR) posed by future rockfall in residential areas
(Massey et al., 2014). AIFR maps were used by CCC to define residential red
zones, where life safety risk from future rockfalls was deemed to be beyond soci-
etally tolerable. In this instance, CCC was the decision-maker. A↵ected parties
(e.g., landowners) were given the opportunity to challenge red zone decisions
in independent submissions to a hearings board; in this instance the hearing
board panelists were the decision-makers. GNS Scientists and collaborators
communicated ongoing research and results to decision-makers, stake-holders,
immediately a↵ected members of the public, and the public-at-large. Prior to
and concurrent with this process, an independent group of university-based
scientists conducted and published research on pre-historic rockfalls and their
implications for contemporary hazards. This research was ultimately provided
to and considered by decision-makers in the hearings, although the researchers
did not initially undertake the research for this purpose. The order of actions
conducted by these researchers initiated with acquisition and analysis of rock-
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fall e↵ects (#2), consequences (#3) vulnerabilities and exposure (#4) that
enabled the formulation of research questions and methods that were used to
seek research funding and approval for further site studies (#8). Subsequent
research (#1, #7, #6, #5) was submitted for peer review, published (Mackey
and Quigley, 2014), and made publicly available through the author’s (MQ’s)
personal website (#12). The authors notified the media of their results, and
an article on their research findings was published in the Christchurch Press4.
Some a↵ected landowners read this article, considered the implications of re-
sults, and invited an author of the research (MQ) to submit the article as
evidence to the hearings (#14). MQ noted the identities and protocols of the
decision-makers (#10) and submitted additional supporting evidence in re-
sponse to solicitation by the decision-making panel (#13). He participated in
group caucusing, joint statement authoring, and was interviewed as an ex-
pert witness (#15) where explicit statements pertaining the role, expertise,
and perspectives of the author (#18), the limitations, uncertainties, and po-
tential biases of the contributed science evidence (#17), additional relevant
inputs (#11), and constructive comments pertaining to the decision-making
process (#20) were made publicly available5. Class 3 actions (#21, #22, #24,
#27, #28) were also undertaken following completion of the decision-making
process (Figure 1).
S2 describes interactions between decision-makers and science providers
initiated by a query from a farming industry member (a decision-maker) to
a scientific researcher. The scientist first defined the decision-maker’s goals
(#10), then acquired and analyzed relevant scientific data (#1–5, #7). The
provision of scientific information to the decision-maker in this case had a
narrow scope (#12, #13, #17), reflecting the specificity of the enquiry. Noting
the potential broader industry impact, the scientist sought additional funding
and resources (#8) to expand the research and subsequent dissemination (#22,
#23, #27, #28).
In S3, many of the science actions and pathways used are constrained by
the restricted time frames inherent in an operational response to flooding (or
any natural disaster). Routine flood forecasting activities (non-operational)
ensure flood forecasters are familiar with the science of pre-existing data, risks,
e↵ects and expected consequences (#1). Flood forecasts are undertaken using
weather forecasts and observational data (#2, #6), and with consideration of
the needs of the decision makers (#10). The forecasts are provided to decision-
makers (#13), who may solicit scientific advice on impacts (#3–5) from other
parties or determine those potential impacts directly.
S4 includes an extensive suite of science actions undertaken by author
CW and the contributing science providers of the Tasmanian State Natural
Disaster Risk Assessment (White et al., 2016). Led by science providers, the
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decision-makers to come together in a risk-based workshop setting to iden-
tify (#1–5, #7) and collaboratively assess (#12–17) Tasmania’s “state level”
priority emergency risks, noting that Tasmania was the first Australian state
or territory to undertake this national mandate. The examples of the science
provision pathways (#21–24) may be useful for science providers undertaking
this process elsewhere.
In S5, science actions and provision pathways were built into a mining
company’s consent application. Class 1 actions underpinned the early stages
of the application process, in which the consent applicant was required to
demonstrate understanding of the current state of the environment, the po-
tential environmental issues and prepare impact assessments for these issues
(#1, #2, #57, #9). Class 2 actions began once the application was received, at
which time third party scientific advice was sought by the decision-makers, and
the application underwent six lodgment reviews for more complete scientific
information (#10–13, #15-20). In total, 75 submitters made 294 submissions
with requests to appear at the hearing (#14). In refusing the application,
the decision-maker e↵ectively nullified possible Class 3 actions (e.g., #21–24)
within the confines of the case.
In S6, the utility of Class 1 science actions and Class 2 science provision
actions pertain primarily to fiscal interests of mining and petroleum compa-
nies seeking to maximize their ability to explore for and extract an economic
resource. Any given science provider may be directed in specific manner (i.e.,
using a small selection of total actions used by all science providers) to pro-
vide highly specialized information relevant to the targeted objectives of the
company at the given time. These objectives are typically related to whether
a resource is to be developed, held, or abandoned, which are decisions that
each have di↵erent levels of risk. Developing a resource requires significant in-
vestment in order to achieve financially viable production. Holding a resource
is usually done in order to plan development at a later stage, either for market
reasons, such as a forecast increase in commodity prices or decrease in labour
costs, or in anticipation of a joint venture agreement or share market o↵ering
that attracts investment and finances development. Abandoning is to either
decommission or sell the resource. While these decisions have been listed in
order of decreasing cost, other factors, such as market sentiment and geopol-
itics, may change this ranking. Nonetheless, geological uncertainty is central
to these decisions which often determine the fate of a company. This is re-
flected in the example viable pathway, in which action #10 is the first to be
undertaken. Uncertainty characterisation and data modelling actions comprise
early steps in the sequence, and only a select group of the listed actions are
delineated.
In S7, scientific actions in GBR decision-making have focused heavily on
Class 1 (#1–5, #7–9), with scientists able to conduct scientific analysis of the
status and trends of the reef through Australian Government funding initia-
tives aimed at addressing issues outlined in the Reef Plan6. Class 2 actions
6 http://www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/long-term-sustainability-plan



































Fig. 2 Summary of science actions utilized in the case studies. (See Figure 1 for corre-
sponding description of Action #.)
(#10–13, #15–19) have received less focus, and Class 3 actions (#22–24, #27–
28) have been limited, although this is improving as evidenced through for-
mation of GBR stakeholder groups and recent government funding targeting
reef restoration activities.
Figure 2 summarizes the usage of science actions across the case studies.
Actions #6, #11, #18, #19, #20 and #25–26 are identified as under-utilized
actions in the cases considered, and, therefore, potentially in the broader realm
of decision-making. These actions may be considered avenues for improve-
ment within the scientific community, although the context of these actions
is important. For example, not all actions and pathways in Figures 1 and 2
may be viable for all scenarios. Some under-utilized actions (#8–9, #14–15,
#16) are likely to be highly scenario-specific, with their utility conditional
upon provider and decision-maker identities, needs, and internal and exter-
nal protocols and influences. In some scenarios, undertaking actions not listed
here, or within a di↵erent context, or in di↵erent order from those evidenced
here could have adverse e↵ects. Science provisions directly to a↵ected parties
or stake-holders through the media (#16) could generate potentially harm-
ful e↵ects in emergency-related situations (S3) or industry-funded activities
(S6). Similarly, undertaking this action prior to peer-review (#9) might not
be appropriate if the underlying science has not been independently evalu-
ated or supported by accessible evidence. As evidenced by S1a, undertaking
action (#16) within a robust provision pathway o↵ers a strategic option for
science providers seeking to advocate for unsolicited but relevant science in
decision-making. Actions #25–26, which pertain to improving science provi-
sion pathways, were not utilized in any of the case studies. Nevertheless, they
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were identified by the authors as desirable actions based on their experiences.
Consideration of how pathways for the communication of scientific advice can
be improved is always warranted, even if improvements cannot be identified
and/or implemented.
3.3 Scientific inputs to decision-making: Decision trees
Figure 3 provides decision trees that reveal how scientific inputs entered deci-
sion-making frameworks. The overarching question for which decision-making
is required (bold and underlined questions) is underpinned by a sequence of
incremental questions (boxes) that are described in more detail and placed
into context (italics) with a sample representative decision-making pathways
indicated (circled options).
Figures 3a–b show pathways from S1a. These represent empirically-evi-
denced decision-making scenarios where the decision trees present sample de-
cision pathways enacted for a specific individual property at risk from rockfall
and/or cli↵ collapse. Red-zone decisions were considered as an avoidance strat-
egy to reduce risks to life and infrastructure from future rockfall (Figure 3a)
and cli↵ collapse (Figure 3b). Figures 3c-d show liquefaction decision trees de-
duced from CERA-issued initial public documents explaining the justification
for liquefaction red-zone decisions (Figure 3c), and deduced from an initially
confidential Cabinet memorandum presented to the government by the Min-
ister for Earthquake Recovery (Figure 3d). The primary distinction among
these decision trees is, on the surface, the explicit inclusion of science and
engineering criteria in the public document (Figure 3c) versus the strictly eco-
nomic parameters discussed by Cabinet (Figure 3d); further analysis of this
aspect is the focus of ongoing research. The enacted red-zone decisions shown
in Figures 3a–d comprise only a small percentage of the total decisions in the
region that resulted in approval for ongoing residential consent (green-zone;
⇡ 200, 000 buildings).
Figures 3e,f,h provide decision trees for scenarios where di↵erent pathways
arise as farmers (S2), emergency managers (S3) or resource companies (S6)
may encounter di↵erent values of scientific and non-scientific inputs at each
of the incremental steps. Figure 3g shows a specific, empirically-evidenced
decision-making scenario from S5 in which the delineated pathway was taken
by decision-makers to decline a mining consent. Figure 3i provides a theoretical
example of a decision-making framework that could be (but has not been)
implemented for a specifically-defined scenario (S7).
The order of sub-questions in the decision trees is not intended to represent
the decision-making process as linear and sequential. In some cases, decision-
makers addressed many sub-questions concurrently or in a di↵erent order from
that specified in Figure 3. Two examples of the non-linearity of decision trees
exist in S2. Firstly, sensible testing of the modelling of proposed crop manage-
ment change (Figure 3e, 4th box) could highlight the need for a reassessment of
the e↵ectiveness of the crop growth models themselves (Figure 3e, 3rd box).
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c) Should a liquefaction-affected residential property be ‘red-zoned’? (simplified from public document)
Was land damage at the site 
and in the surrounding area 
significant and extensive?
Analysis of field surveys, lidar, geodetic data
to quantify liquefaction extent and severity, and 










Review and feasiblity studies of exisiting
land remediation approaches and technologies 
relevant to affected sites 
b) Should a residential property affected by cliff collapse be ‘red-zoned’?
Did CES cliff collapse 
occur at and / or proximal 
to the site ?
Analysis of field surveys, lidar, geodetic, GPS data
to quantify cliff collapse extent and severity, and 







Is future seismic activity and 
associated cliff collapse likely?
Does future cliff collapse pose 




YES Is land remediation 




Analysis of ongoing seismicity rates and locations,
determination of CES ground motions that triggered 
cliff collapse, analysis of ongoing land displacement,
probabilistic forecasts of future earthquakes,
forecasts of future cliff collapse extents and severity
Analysis of  scientific data
acquired from previous steps
for residential sites
Review and feasiblity 
studies of exisiting
land remediation 
approaches and technologies 
relevant to affected sites 
Review and feasiblity 
studies of exisiting
land remediation 
approaches and technologies 
relevant to affected sites 
a) Should a residential property affected by rockfall / boulder roll be ‘red-zoned’?
Did rockfalls occur at 
and / or proximal to the 
site during the CES?
Field surveys, aerial photos used to
map locations, dimensions, and source areas 







Is future seismic activity and 
associated rockfall likely?
Does future rockfall pose 
an unacceptable risk to life? NO
red zoned
Analysis of rockfall-triggering CES 
ground motions, analysis of ongoing land 
displacement, probabilistic forecasts 
of future earthquakes, forecasts of
future cliff collapse extents and severity
Computation of annual individual fatality risk from future rockfalls using 
calculations of annual probability of a rockfall-initiating event X probability 
of a person, if present, being in the path of one or more boulders at a given location 
X probability that a person is present at that location when the event occurs X 
probability of aperson being killed if present and in the path of one or more boulders
Are protective works to mitigate the life safety risk 
practicable in terms of feasibility, disruption to 
landowners, timeliness and cost effectiveness?
Review and feasiblity 
studies of rockfall risk reduction
approaches and technologies 
relevant to affected sites 
YES
f ) Should a general area evacuation be ordered during a flooding event?
Are properties in the area 
forecast to be inundated?
Analysis of weather forecasts, stream and dam water level 
data, storm water systems, and lidar and other 
GIS data of urban systems to quantify the expected water 







Are properties forecast 
to be isolated?
Is the isolation forecast 
to be protracted?
Analysis of inundation maps overlayed with 
the road and river network to identify isolation 
points and the impacted communities
Are residents generally 
prepared and 
resilient to extended 
isolation?
NO





Analysis of extended weather 
and flood forecasts, flood impact 
(damage) forecasts and 
emergency response plans to identify 
the expected duration of isolation
Review of community and public resources 
and demographic information 
to determine the most effective evacuation 
plan given the timeframes to inundation, 
isolation or unsafe travel conditions
YES
Review of demographic and social data, 
feedback from community interactions, 
community and public resources, 
and consideration of the emergency response 
plan to evaluate whether the community 
is likely to require external assistance 
or be self sufficient during and after the flood
e) Should a farmer change agricultural practice to increase the likelihood of maximum crop yields in a new agricultural region?
(Case study 2)








YESIs there existing 
knowledge on how to 
achieve these yields?
Are there effective and 
robust crop growth models 
for the crop(s) of interest?
Scientific reviews of available 
crop models to assess suitability 
Analysis of available historic yield data and practices.  
Literature reviews of government and industry resources
NO
YES Is farm management change likely  
to increase potential yield enough 
to warrant practice change in the 
face of inherent climate variability?
Simulation of crop yield in response 
to different management and environmental 
factors for the given location
NO
YES
Is it feasible for the 
farmer to implement 
the management change 
(e.g. do they have the 
irrigation infrastructure 
and practice irrigation)
Self assessment by the farmer to 
determine if equiped with 
infrastructure and other resources 








change implemented Cost-benefit assessment by the farmer to determine 
if a change in management is financially possible and benficial
Estimated cost of reinstating the land to its pre-earthquake 
condition, up to a maximum value capped by the estimated 
value of the land
New Zealand Earthquake
Commission (national insurance
provider) financial contribution 
to land remediation
d) Should a liquefaction-affected residential property be ‘red-zoned’? (economic criteria presented to Cabinet by Minister for earthquake recovery)
(Case study S1b)
+
“Betterment cost” (i.e. perimeter 
treatment and/or 
additional raising of the land)
Estimated cost of raising the land to an elevation to consent 
with the city building code (“betterment cost - raising of land”), 
plus the estimated cost of mitigating against lateral-spreading 
effects that could occur in future earthquakes (“betterment cost - perimeter treatment”)
+
Infrastructure removal and 
replacement costs
> value of relevant land as at 2007
=






Is future seismic activity and 
associated land damage likely?
Analysis of ongoing seismicity, 
determination of liquefaction vulnerabilities,
probabilistic forecasts of future earthquakes
and future liquefaction
Are proposed remedial land 
engineering solutions uncertain 
in terms of design, success 
and possible timely commencement?
Review and feasiblity studies of exisiting
land remediation approaches and technologies 
relevant to affected sites 
Would proposed land engineering 
solutions be disruptive and 
protracted for landowners?





Estimated cost of removing and replacing 
damaged infrastructure (e.g., roads, sewerage, 
potable water, power infrastructure
Fig. 3 Decision trees. Questions requiring decision-making appear in bold underline with
a liated case study number listed in italics beneath. Boxes denote sub-questions related
to the overarching question. Italics provide details on the nature and context of science
provisions relevant to each sub-question. Sample pathways indicated with circles and final
decision denoted by grey-coloured circle.
Second, if the proposed management change is not possible due to fiscal or
economic constraints (Figure 3e, 5th and 6th boxes), other potential changes
may be investigated (Figure 3, 4th box). Some decision trees are also simplified
interpretations of highly complex decision-making pathways. For example, in
S5 (Figure 3g) the decision-making committee appointed to rule on the deep-
sea mining application made 44 additional requests for further information
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h) Should resource exploration and extraction strategies, volume estimates, and value assessments utilize this 3D model?
g) Should consent for deep sea phosphate mining in New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be granted?
i) Should catchment management practices change to reduce pollutant delivery to the Great Barrier Reef?
(Case study 7)
Did the consent applicant
present the best available science 
in support of its mining application?
The Chatham Rise is the best known part of 
New Zealand’s EEZ as a result of decades of 
research and exploration particularly in 
relation to the naturally occurring phosphate 
nodules.The proposal and impact assessments 
were supported by numerous scientific studies 




Modelling contributed to assessments of 
possible mining impacts on:
• oceanography / hydrodynamics • sediment 
plume dynamics and sedimentation • species’ 
trophic relationships • operational noise 
propagation and marine mammals 
• benthic species’ distribution • commercial 
fish species distribution and population 
• habitat prediction and spatial planning
• economic benefits • ecotoxicology and human 
health • mining excavations on seafloor bathymetry.
Base-line empirical data existed for many areas 
of the marine environment but for others data 
were only available at a low spatial resolution.
Empirical data were not available for measuring 
the impacts of the mining operations because 
no mining had taken place here or in analgous 
environments globally. This resulted 
in a strong reliance on models that had 
high uncertainties due to lack of model 
validation or ground-truthing through 
in situ trial surveys.  
Was all relevant science
clearly and effectively 
communicated to 
decision-makers?
The consent applicant stated that project 
descriptions, environmental characteristics, 
and likely effects of mining were 
complex and could have been presented  
in a more clear and steam-lined manner. 
The hearing process enabled additional 
data not included in initial 
application to be presented to the DMC 
in a piecemeal manner. 
YES Did the EMMP adequately 
address the risks identified 
in the EIAs?
DMC concluded there was inadequate information 
and intolerable or unacceptable risks and uncertainties 
associated with the proposed seabed mining. The main 
concern was related to the impact of the drag-head 
on the seabed and potential impacts on 
benthic fauna in and on the seabed. 
(Case study 5)
(Case study 6)
Figure 3 (g-i): Examples of decision trees and relevant earth and environmental scientific inputs for decisions considered in this study
YES Were there sufficient base-line 
empirical data to assess the 
marine environment and likely 
impacts of mining operations?
Did models accurately represent
the marine environment and forecast 
the likely effects of enviromental 





Did science experts agree with the conclusions the 
consent applicant made from the base-line data and 
models used to create Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) and the Environmental Management 
and Monitoring Plan (EMMP)?
NO
YES
Science experts agreed on the following:  - Most activities associated with mining were not 
deemed likely to have adverse environmental effects (e.g., return of mined host sediment 
to the seabed, and impacts on fisheries resources)  -  Impacts on benthic habitat and fauna 
loss within the mining blocks were deemed to be serious and almost certain, even if avoidance, 
remediation, and mitigation measures were undertaken - The impact to benthic habitat 
and fauna was characterised  as adverse, near-source confined, medium to long-term 
but ultimately reversible. However, during the hearing the uncertainty around 
the assessment of  reversibility became a point of debate and remained, 
in the view of the DMC, a disputed and uncertain fact. In the absence of further
supporting evidence the DMC favored caution by assuming the 
impact would be irreversible.
Was the science presented certain
enough in the view of the DMC
to justify prioritization against other
important inputs including societal
concern, lack of precedent, and 
environmental precaution?
Science was only one component of decision making, and did not necessarily 
address society’s environmental and values-based concerns. In accordance 
with the EEZ Act, the  DMC also had to be sensitive to and navigate other 
regimes such as the Mid Chatham Rise Benthic Protection Area (BPA). The 
DMC was concerned that the seafloor where mining was to occur was 
protected, under fishery regulations, from trawling and dredging in the Mid 
Chatham Rise Benthic Protection Area (BPA). The DMC also had to weigh 
the existing interests of other parties in the region. Throughout the hearing, 
the extent of empirical verification was a common concern among expert 
and lay witnesses alike. A large number of parties opposed to the application 
asserted that there was too much uncertainty about the modelling for the 
consent to be granted. The possible environmental impacts of mining were 
viewed as unavoidable and unable to be mitigated by imposing an adaptive 
management approach.  In the absence of global precedents and empirical 
data (ie. high epistemic uncertainties) these considerations were viewed as 





YESIn favoring caution and environmental 
protection, did the DMC first consider 
whether taking an adaptive management 




Section 61 (3) of the EEZ Act states "If favouring caution 
and environmental protection means that an activity is 
likely to be refused, the EPA must first consider whether 
taking an adaptive management approach would allow 
the activity to be undertaken."  - The DMC considered 
the applicant's EMMP to be inadequate however, under 
an adaptive management approach, the DMC could require 
additional conditions to be met such that the applicant could 
commence activities on a small scale or for a short period so 
that the effects could be monitored (Section 64). - Such 
conditions could include additional pre-mining research, 
data collection and in situ trials to validate and address model 
uncertainties as well as creating mining exclusions areas.
- The DMC concluded that no set of conditions prescribed in 
an adaptive management approach could address the question 
of impacts to the benthic environment without substantial 
research and in situ trials prior to mining and that this would 
be an unreasonable imposition on the applicant. 
Input data may too sparse (epistemically
uncertain), too ambiguous, and / or too 
discrepent (due to geologic, methodologic, 
or analytical variabilities that increase 
aleatoric uncertainties) to enable 
construction of 3D models with 
sufficient accuracy and precision to 
justify use in targeted exploration drilling. 
SeeType 1, 2 and 3 uncertainties 
(Mann, 1993) in S6.
NO NO
YES
Is the model accurate and precise enough
and uncertainties sufficiently characterised 
to enable cost-benefits of expensive (targeted) 
exploration and other forms 
of fiscal, logistical, and environmental
risk analysis related to drilling to be conducted? 
Can the volume and volumetric uncertainties 
of the resource be determined? 
Residuals between the model predictions,
and empirical observations (i.e. the best available 
model input data plus any additional data obtained 
subsequent to model development) should be low enough 
to ensure the model is of sufficient accuracy to enhance
knowledge of likely locations of petroleum target.
Monte Carlo simulations and other uncertainty 
assessment tests how well the model represents 
the target geology. Model-observation residuals enable 
estimates of locational and volumetric uncertainty.
YES
Are model uncertainties sufficiently
characterised such that decision-
makers could use the model to 
evaluate cost-benefits and other risks, 
estimate volume and value? NO
YESAre existing data of sufficient volume, 
quality, and certainty to enable construction 
of a predictively useful 3D model?
Does the 3D model accurately
represent what is known 
about the location 
and geometry of the 
petroleum target from best
available data?
use 3D model to guide further exploration and extraction
strategies, estimate resource volumes, and assess economic value
improve model by obtaining and integrating 
additional drilling and other data (geophysics, 
field mapping, geochemistry, remote sensing) 
and additional model development and uncertainty analysis 
to produce new models with increased accuracy and precision
for reconsideration within this decsion-making framework
Are pollutant loads quantified over 
relevant time-scales at several sites 
within a catchment 
and/or at the end-of-catchment? 
Despite uncertainty being identified as an 
important output for GBR catchment 
pollutant modelling it is not currently 
quantified for loads either at the end of a 
catchment or spatially (observed and modeled)
within a catchment. If uncertainty is not 
quantified a manager cannot confidently 
prioritise catchments or identify hotspots 
within catchments. Decisions without 
uncertainty analyses are susceptible 
to over-interpretations based on perceived 
signals that might instead be random variations.
Catchment modelling has the capacity to quantify 
loads spatially for each site located along a stream 
network defined for a catchment. However, the 
load at the end-of the catchment is typically reported 
in the GBR report card. The spatio-temporal 
representation of the load can be useful for 
prioritising where in the catchment remediation is 
necessary while the end-of-catchment load can only 
help to prioritise catchments without any regard to 
where in the catchment the source of the problem lies.
YES
Is uncertainty quantified for 
end-of-catchment loads?











Do the affected parties sufficiently understand
communications of various data and uncertainties
to enable the utility of objective science evidence 
in decision-making?  Do qualitative measures 
and communications of uncertainty accurately
represent quantitative measurements? While a scenario 
analysis may have identified a best management 
practice for the region, if this information is unsuccessfully communicated, it may lead 
to a difficulty in understanding how a change may lead to a reduction in loads.
If statistically significant pollutant loads
or “hotspots” within a catchment have been 
identified using empirical data and / or
modeling, these values and uncertainties
could be compared with threshold
estimates of concern established by decision-
makers. Additionally, these data could assist
to better inform what values should be 
used to establish thresholds for concern.
Do statistically-validated end-of-
catchment pollutant loads exceed 
established thresholds for concern?
Do statistically-validated (modeled) 
catchment pollutant loads exceed 
established thresholds for concern?
Are model epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties
sufficiently low enough to conclusively demonstrate
that changes in land practices could lower 
pollutant delivery to the catchment and to the
GBR via the end-of-catchment?
Are pollutant loads increasing towards thresholds?





If quantified pollutant loads or “hotspots” within a catchment are increasing 
with a statistically significant trend towards pollutant thresholds, decision-makers 
may consider a tiered approach to decision-making that begins with a “watch” 
and further monitoring of the site, to a more responsive approach when the 
threshold has been exceeded. If pollutant loads have not increased, it is also 
important to understand whether sufficient conclusive data exists; if not, further 
pollutant monitoring and modeling may be required to determine pollutant 
stability from epistemic uncertainty. If sources of pollutants are identified, are 
corresponding land practices known sufficiently to enable possible causative links 
to be hypothesized and investigated? If not, can further monitoring and analysis 
be undertaken?
Are the catchment sources of pollutants 
and land practices sufficiently characterised 
to enable causations to be investigated? YES
NO
Do models conclusively demonstrate that 
changing land practices will reduce 




Can model results and uncertainties
be successfully communicated 
to experts and stake-holders to 
determine best management practice?
YES
NO
Are recommended land practice changes
logistically and economically feasible
and able to be iteratively analysed
to evaluate the success of their utility? NO
YES trial land management changes to 
reduce pollutant delivery to GBR
improve utility of land practice changes
by addressing logistical, economic, and 
other (e.g., political?) impediments and
developing methods to evaluate their success
Do affected parties have the logistical and economic
means to undertake recommended land practice
changes? Will monitoring of sites and associated 
catchment pollutant concentrations enable the effectiveness of changing land practices on reducing pollutant loads to be quantified?
If a new land practice has been implemented, there will be a time lag between the time of implementation and when a change in 
load has been detected. This time lag is often outside of the political time frames that are used to demonstrate “progress”. If it is 
determined that a change in land practice is not economically or logistically feasible, alternative mechanisms for implementing 
change will need to be considered. For a farmer, a change in land practice is complicated and incentives may need to be considered 
to bring about change. Prioritisations may also need to be revisited in light of this.
Fig. 3 continued
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from the applicant on many topics, even after the application was accepted
as complete by the Environmental Protection Authority of New Zealand. The
rockfall (S1a) and liquefaction (S1b) cases o↵er an interesting contrast; in the
case of S1a, a large volume of detailed scientific information was acquired prior
to decision-making, to the detriment of decision-making expediency, while in
S1b, science inputs are not present as specified entities, almost certainly (in
part) because of the acknowledged need for decision-makers to expedite the
provision of certainty to a↵ected landowners. It is likely that defining the in-
dividual life safety risks in S1a were prioritized above expediency, while the
risks in S1b were largely socioeconomic in nature and could be more rapidly
assessed using the expert opinions of scientists and engineers, rather than ex-
tensive acquisition of additional scientific information.
In addition to science inputs, decision-makers identified engineering (Fig-
ures 3a–c,e,g), economic (Figures 3a,b,e,g–i), and societal inputs including life
safety and well-being (Figure 3a–c,f,g) as relevant inputs. Some of these inputs
are co-dependent upon earth science inputs. For example, the economic viabil-
ity of a potential engineering solution (e.g., rockfall protection in S1) and its
ability to reduce life safety risk relates to hazard (i.e., frequency-distribution-
severity of rockfall), exposure (i.e., will rockfall boulders travel into populated
areas), and vulnerability elements (i.e., are boulder impact energies likely to
exceed resisting strengths of existing infrastructure?) that depend in part upon
earth science inputs for quantification. Some decisions are likely to have been
influenced by additional inputs that are less dependent on earth science ev-
idence, including (i) insurance (King et al., 2014), which might have better
equipped decision-makers to undertake decision-making with large economic
losses, (ii) stake-holder opinion, such as prevailing public opinion in policy-
based decisions that was (S1, Figures 3a–c) or was not (S5, Figure 3g) well-
aligned with prevailing science evidence, (iii) company share-holder priority
economic interests in industry-related decisions (S6, Figure 3h), and (iv) polit-
ical motivations and risks (S7, Figure 3i). Intriguingly, some enacted decisions
(S1, S5) were selected despite the availability of more economically-favourable
decision alternatives. In S1, community life safety and socioeconomic risks
were prioritized despite a large financial cost to the central government, and
in S5 a precautionary approach to environmental risks was prioritized above
the potential for economic benefits from mining.
The decision trees presented in Figure 3a,b,c,g may all be considered ex-
amples of scientifically-informed (i.e., a diverse range of relevant science inputs
were considered), precautionary decisions (i.e., the risks associated with large
epistemic and statistical uncertainties in some of the science inputs were con-
sidered in a risk-adverse manner) with adaptive capacity (i.e., property owners
in S1 and the mining company in S5 were given opportunities to appeal initial
decisions). In S1, independent reviews and hearings resulted in new decisions
(e.g., some red-zone properties were green-zoned and vice versa).
A common element among the decision trees is the progression from an ini-
tial phase, where preliminary decision-making steps are informed by scientific
observations, data, analyses, and expert judgment, to an intermediate phase
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informed by science-based simulations and forecast models of future scenarios,
to a later phase, including risk-based feasibility and cost-benefit analyses of
future scenarios, during which other (non-earth science) inputs may be most
relevant in influencing decision-making pathways. This highlights an impor-
tant aspect of science-informed decision-making; earth science may play an
important role in shaping the initial trajectory of decision-making in response
to a specific risk, however, other inputs (e.g., economic, feasibility, political)
may ultimately be more influential in decision-making, particularly at crucial
late-stage increments. Science providers should be aware of this aspect and
may wish to continue to undertake science actions including advocacy (Fig-
ure 1) during the later stages of decision-making to promote continued science
utility in the latter stages of decision-making. The use of independent (non-
political) decision-making bodies (S1, S3, S5) where appropriate appears to
reduce the potential of political inputs to transcend science inputs in late-stage
decision-making. In contrast, involvement of government agencies in science
assessments might improve the potential for uptake of the scientific informa-
tion and integration into policy (S4).
3.4 Assessing science utility in decision-making
In Figure 4, we perform a self-assessment for each case study using an elicita-
tion approach promoted by Speirs-Bridge et al. (2010) as a method for reducing
overconfidence in the interval judgments of experts. The authors were invited
to respond about scientific uptake and agreement with respect to their indi-
vidual case study using a 4-point elicitation procedure that asks for a lower
limit, upper limit, best guess and a level of confidence in the interval that they
provided. The following questions were posed to authors of each case study:
– Scientific Uptake
1. In thinking about the potentially-relevant and available science (both
data and expertise) used in decision-making, what do you think the
lowest % of uptake was for your case study?
2. In thinking about the potentially-relevant and available science (both
data and expertise) used in decision-making, what do you think the
highest % of uptake was for your case study?
3. In thinking about the potentially-relevant and available science (both
data and expertise) used in decision-making, what is your best guess of
the % uptake for your case study?
4. How confident are you that your interval, from lowest to highest, cap-
tures the scientific uptake for your case study?
– Scientific Agreement
1. In thinking about the scientific agreement amongst earth science in-
puts considered by decision-makers, what do you think the lowest % of
agreement was for your case study?





































Fig. 4 Summary of science utility in decision-making. Elicited 80% confidence intervals
showing each study’s self-assessment in terms of scientific uptake as a percentage (x-axis) and
scientific agreement as a percentage (y-axis). Elicited information for scientific agreement in
the format (study #, lower, upper, “best guess” and confidence) are (S1a, 75, 90, 85, 90),
(S1b, 60, 90, 85, 60), (S2, 40, 80, 65, 60), (S3, 15, 90, 40, 85), (S4, 15, 90, 50, 70), (S5, 50,
90, 75, 70), (S6, 50, 90, 70, 70), and (S7, 60, 80, 65, 80). Elicited information for scientific
uptake in the format (study #, lower, upper, “best guess” and confidence) are (S1a, 70, 95,
85, 85), (S1b, 10, 80, 60, 95), (S2, 10, 90, 75, 70), (S3, 82, 95, 50, 75), (S4, 10, 95, 60, 85),
(S5, 50, 95, 70, 75), (S6, 50, 95, 70, 75), and (S7, 20, 70, 30, 70).
2. In thinking about the scientific agreement amongst earth science inputs
considered by decision-makers, what do you think the highest % of
agreement was for your case study?
3. In thinking about the scientific agreement amongst earth science in-
puts considered by decision-makers, what is your best guess of the %
agreement for your case study?
4. How confident are you that your interval, from lowest to highest, cap-
tures the percentage of scientific agreement for your case study?
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Estimates from the elicitation exercise are displayed as percentages (col-
ored circles) in Figure 4 accompanied by 80% confidence intervals. These were
constructed by assuming a normal distribution of arcsine values based on the
level of confidence provided by each expert using the method proposed by
Speirs-Bridge et al. (2010). In some instances, confidence intervals overlapped
and therefore show a blending of colours corresponding to the respective case
studies.
The majority of case studies reside in the top right quadrant of Figure
4, with the exception to S3 (floods) and S7 (pollutants to the GBR). This
suggests that for the many of the case studies there is considerable scientific
agreement and uptake of the methods, which is positive to note. While case
study S2 (agriculture) and S1b (liquefaction) have their estimates (coloured
circles) within this quadrant, there is a reasonable amount of uncertainty sur-
rounding their respective estimate. In S1b, limited scientific information was
available at the time of decision-making, but scientific and engineering ex-
perts were available to provide expert judgment to accommodate the needs of
decision-makers to make expedient decisions. The scientific evidence obtained
following decision-making ultimately supported the decisions made (Figure 3
c,d). This case provides an important example of how the expediency required
for decision-making may not always enable relevant science to be obtained
for potential utility. The lack of confidence with which we can estimate how
science actually informed the (i) need for a land use policy, and (ii) the actual
property-by-property decisions in S1b results in large uncertainties for this
data point (Figure 4).
For S2, the interval elicited for scientific uptake is quite broad, revealing
a lower bound of approximately 19% and an upper bound of 68%. There is
also large variability in the consideration and agreement of scientific data for
this case study. For case studies like this that involve many di↵erent decision-
makers (e.g., individual farmers in S2, and di↵erent resource companies in S6)
the error bars also reflect the potential variance in scientific consensus and
utility amongst the specific decision-making cases (e.g., individual farms) that
collectively comprise the case study. For example, scientific consensus might be
high for one farm and low for another (thus defining a large error bar about
a medium consensus centroid) and one farmer might use a large volume of
science in decision-making while another might use very little (thus defining a
medium utility value with large error bar).
Case study S3 (floods) resides close to the lower left quadrant of Figure 4,
with reasonably wide confidence intervals, suggesting uncertainty in the up-
take and agreement of scientific information. This a reflection of the the case
study’s focus on challenges in the communication of the uncertainty associ-
ated with scientific advice within the context of highly uncertain, and often
variable throughout an event, flood and flood impact forecasting. Thus, while
consideration of scientific advice is estimated (by the author) to be very high,
uptake is estimated to be considerably more variable. This variability results
from taking a precautionary approach with uncommunicated uncertainty and
high time-pressures. For the case of pollutants to the GBR (case study S7), the
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estimate for the intersection between scientific agreement and uptake resides
in the upper left quadrant of Figure 4. While scientific agreement may be con-
fidently elicited to be high, there is considerable variability in terms of uptake
and its best guess is elicited to be quite low, suggesting that there may be
other factors preventing uptake outside the control of the scientific provider.
It is interesting to note that both S5 (seabed mining) and S6 (resource mod-
elling) convey similar information when considering scientific agreement and
uptake, apart from the di↵erence in the elicited best guess. This suggests the
authors experiences with regards to these two case studies were similar and
could be attributed to the nature of the decisions being sought.
It is di cult to imagine many case studies with estimates of uptake and
agreement falling into the bottom right quadrant of Figure 4 as this would
indicate scientific uptake when agreement was minimal. It would be more
plausible when there is lack of scientific agreement to see little to no uptake
on approaches.
Decisions may be less well aligned with prevailing contributing science if a
lower proportion of available science was used and/or if there is less scientific
consensus in the contributing science. For example, a high volume of scien-
tific information (virtually all the relevant and available science that we are
aware of, including published and unpublished data) was used by decision-
makers in S1a (rockfall risk land zoning). This was because (i) government
o cials tasked with immediately assessing societal risk funded specific scien-
tific investigations to quantify these risks, (ii) decision-makers welcomed the
submission of initially unsolicited science, (iii) decision-makers created inde-
pendent review processes and welcomed additional evidence submissions from
science providers during these processes including site-specific data, and (iv)
decision-makers asked specific questions pertaining to the availability of sci-
entific information during the decision-making process. There was also high
consensus (as evidenced by joint-statements submitted by science providers)
on most of the science evidence. When we consider uptake however, the confi-
dence interval elicited is broader (71-94%). The ultimate decisions varied from
property to property, although science played an essential role in decision-
making, and all decisions aligned with the best available science and/or pro-
vided opportunities for decision revisions if additional scientific information
was presented. In S4 (disaster risks), scientific expertise was elucidated from
a broad field (characterising risks from a diverse array of natural hazards),
and was therefore highly variable (e.g., significant expertise existed in some
specializations, but not in others). As a result, consensus on some contributing
evidence (e.g., state-level consequence of a damaging earthquake in Tasmania)
was medium-low, whereas for others (e.g., bushfire risk) it was far higher. Ul-
timately, the enacted decisions in S4 (i.e., the relative risk ranking of natural
hazards) aligned with the majority of the available scientific evidence, however
the involvement of additional experts might have reduced uncertainty in some
aspects of the analysis.
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4 Discussion
Science can provide objective information relevant for decision-making, irre-
spective of the identities, research methods, and research motives (e.g., pure
versus applied research) of the contributor(s). In many types of decision-
making, it may be useful to consider multiple (and potentially conflicting)
scientific inputs, and it is rare (often unfeasible) for decision-makers to be
aware of all potentially relevant science (and scientists) that may be useful
in addressing their needs. Rather than placing sole responsibility on decision-
makers to solicit relevant science, scientists may attempt to provide potentially
relevant expertise and evidence without initial solicitation. Actions and path-
ways should be explored with the freedom of scientific endeavour but with an
operative awareness of how science might contribute to the “bigger picture”.
E↵ective path-finding between science actions and provision to decision-makers
usually requires time and e↵ort to determine the identities, protocols, and
needs of decision-makers, other relevant science providers, and stake-holders.
Science provisions may be solicited or unsolicited, duly acknowledged or un-
requited, formally or informally presented, and direct or highly indirect (e.g.,
traveling from research papers to media to stake-holders to decision-makers).
These attributes require science providers to be strategic, adaptive, creative,
and persistent. The possession of social and political intelligence may assist sci-
entists to provide their expertise in the most appropriate manner and context
to increase its utility, particularly where prevailing science evidence favours
a decision that is opposed by other inputs. Decision-makers also have a re-
sponsibility to seek experts in a manner that scientists might find intuitive
but which is rarely used, for example, by undertaking internet searches for
relevant research publications, and/or providing potential pathways for the
provision of unsolicited science. Four of the case studies considered showed
use of these pathways and consideration of initially unsolicited science evi-
dence in deliberations of decision-makers (Table 1). Importantly, there is no
guarantee that increasing the provision of science will increase the quantity or
quality of science used in decision-making. Ultimately, scientists must bear the
responsibility for ensuring that the best and most relevant science is provided,
whether it is their own or that of others.
There are many factors that limit the ability of scientists to provide their
research evidence to decision-makers. Some of the factors are internal, for
example, intra-institutional decisions on science communication strategies, se-
lection of individuals for communications (such as hierarchical or talent-based
communication frameworks), a perceived need for constant and consistent sci-
entific messaging, and formal or informal institutional priorities and mandates,
such as a legal obligation for a government-funded science agency to deliver
relevant decision-making inputs through defined channels or to avoid some
science actions due to potential conflicts of interest. Other factors are exter-
nal, for example, decision-maker protocols and priorities, data ownership and
disclosure issues, and stake-holder requirements. The seven case studies show
that: (i) not all relevant science will be solicited by and provided to decision-
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makers through formal channels, such as science advisory panels and other
expert elicitation processes; (ii) not all decision-makers will seek all (or even
any) potential sources of scientific evidence; (iii) not all solicited and provided
science will be fully characterised, understood and utilized in the decision-
making process; and (iv) not all scientifically-informed decision-making will
result in a decision that aligns with prevailing scientific evidence. The subject
diversity of the case studies, while not exhaustive, suggests that the actions
common to all the case studies are likely to be required by science providers
and decision-makers in any scenario. The list shown in Figure 1 provides a
prompt for stakeholders during the planning or initial stages of a scenario
for actions and pathways that are likely required. This prompt is in contrast
to a situation where these actions and pathways are discovered (possibly too
late) while a scenario is in progress. Endevoring towards a goal of e↵ective
team communication, whereby team members understand the needs of other
members and so provide (unsolicited) information via implicity supply (Owen
et al., 2013), may also increase the utility of science advice in decision-making
(Actions 10, 12, 14; Figure 1). Information provision can be improved through
relationship building, via workshops, shared experience, protocol development
and training, prior to an event; or through adequate regular briefing and dis-
cussions of needs within an event if time permits (Doyle and Paton, 2018;
Doyle et al., 2015)
There are many encouraging aspects to be taken from the case studies.
Overall, consistent messaging can be achieved as seen by some actions be-
ing common across the studies despite their diversity. Eight actions are com-
mon to each study (frequency = 7) and can be considered as likely actions
when planning a strategy. S1a included the involvement of science experts
in risk assessments from diverse institutions with diverse science expertise.
Science provider relationships existing prior to the stimulating event enabled
e cient data collection. Pre-existing pathways between science providers and
government allowed for direct science communications to decision-makers. Pro-
cesses allowed for the acceptance of initially unsolicited science into decision-
making processes through multiple and diverse pathways. Precautionary deci-
sions aligned with prevailing science evidence but had adaptive capacity (where
possible) should other relevant scientific and non-scientific inputs emerge. S2
demonstrates that it is possible for science providers to communicate risk suc-
cessfully to a sizeable and diverse industry, even when the decision-makers
are geographically distributed. S3 demonstrates that decision-makers want to
understand how uncertainty has been accounted for in scientific advice. S4
highlights that it is possible for a diverse range of expert science providers and
decision-makers to come together to identify and assess priority emergency
risks collaboratively.
In relation to S5, the Environmental Protection Authority recently awarded
consent for deep-sea mining to another company called Trans-Tasman Re-
sources who were seeking to mine iron sands from it’s South Taranaki Bight
iron sands project located 25 km o↵shore from Patea on the east coast of the
North Island of New Zealand. Consent was granted conditional on two ad-
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ditional years of scientific and environmental monitoring and reporting prior
to mining activities commencing7. However, the decision was quashed in an
appeal to the High Court of New Zealand, which found the decision-makers
applied a “narrow interpretation” to the term “adaptive management”, which
was inconsistent with the intended legal definition8. This shows that precau-
tionary adaptive management approaches might find useful balances among
contrasting inputs, but that linguistic uncertainty around the precise (legal)
meaning of critical words and phrases makes it possible to argue on points of
law, which may or may not lend strength to the utility of science evidence in
the decision-making process for seabed mining consent applications. S6 demon-
strates that science providers are helping to guide decision-makers in resource
exploration programmes, particularly with respect to their communication of
uncertainties. In relation to S7, incorporation of scientific uncertainty into fu-
ture GBR report cards is now being discussed, as well as the potential to
explore the development of methodologies for quantifying and communicating
uncertainty to stakeholders for decision-making.
Just as all science is uncertain and imperfect (Sutherland et al., 2013), so
too are all decision-making processes, even those where science is well provided
and utilized. This study attempts to provide the scientific community with a
sample of the diverse and complex roles and utilities of science in the decision-
making environment. Endeavours to advance any of the actions and pathways
described herein are welcomed and indeed necessary if the emerging challenges
of post-truth, unobjectively-tested decision-making are to be met.
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